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Digitalisierung industrieller Arbeit: 
Entwicklungspfade und Perspektiven
Zusammenfassung Im Beitrag werden erste Forschun-
gsergebnisse über die Konsequenzen des Einsatzes digi-
taler Technologien für industrielle Arbeit zusammengefasst. 
Der Fokus richtet sich besonders auf die Entwicklung der 
deutschen Industrie, deren Entwicklung unter dem Label 
„Industrie 4.0“ seit längerem intensiv diskutiert wird. Aus-
gangsannahme ist, dass gegenwärtig ein weit reichender 
Technologieschub in der industriellen Produktion statt-
findet. In Hinblick auf die Konsequenzen für Arbeit kön-
nen auf der Basis der derzeit vorliegenden Literatur und 
der Forschungsergebnisse allerdings nur widersprüchliche 
Annahmen formuliert werden. Dies betrifft erstens die 
Frage nach den erwartbaren Arbeitsplatzverlusten. Zweit-
ens muss die absehbare Entwicklung von Tätigkeiten 
und Qualifikationen kontrovers diskutiert werden. Auf 
der einen Seite finden sich Tendenzen des „Upgrading“, 
auf der anderen der „Polarisierung“ von Qualifikationen. 
Welcher Entwicklungspfad sich letztlich durchsetzt ist 
abhängig von einer Reihe von Bedingungen wie etwa das 
jeweils verfolgte Technologiekonzept und dem Verlauf des 
Einführungsprozesses der neuen Technologien. Insgesamt 
allerdings ist nur eine begrenzte Verbreitung der neuen 
digitalen Technologien zu erwarten.
1  Technology push towards digitization
The following paper deals with the question of what the 
consequences are of the diffusion and implementation of 
digital technologies for work, and in particular, for work in 
industries. The widespread thesis is that this technology is 
opening completely new and unknown technology applica-
Abstract This paper summarizes considerations and pre-
liminary research results on the consequences of the pro-
gressive use of digital technologies in industrial work. The 
focus is particularly on the situation in German industry, 
where this development has been intensively discussed as 
“Industry 4.0”. Starting point is the assumption that cur-
rently a far-reaching technology push in industrial pro-
duction can be observed. In terms of the potential con-
sequences for industrial labor foreseen by the literature, 
currently contradictory development scenarios are being 
discussed. For one thing, the volume of potential job 
losses caused by the new technologies is highly controver-
sial. For another, diverging consequences for job activi-
ties and qualifications can be recognized, interpreted as 
the “upgrading”, respectively “polarization” of skills. What 
concrete changes actually occur however, is dependent on 
the influence of numerous factors. Especially, what concept 
of technology automation is realized in each case, and its 
respective implementation process, is significant here. The 
conclusion reached is that, in the medium term, at the most 
a somewhat limited spread of digital technologies and their 
consequences can be expected to occur.
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or also financial services, the digitization of which has 
meant far-reaching structural changes in individual business 
models as well as company and industry branch structures 
(Zuboff 2010; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014). Amazon is 
often cited as an example of cases where it makes less and 
less sense to ask whether a company is a retailer, logistics 
company, web-based service company or—as one might 
think more recently—perhaps also a grocer. For this com-
pany like many similar ones, it is rather only the systematic 
use of “big data” that is the basis of its business model.
Today however, already a second phase of the process 
aims to realize the digitization of physical objects of all kinds. 
Shoshana Zuboff calls this development a “second-wave 
mutation” of the technological and related socioeconomic 
change (Zuboff 2010, p. 8). In a primarily technological per-
spective this context is also called the “Internet of things” 
(e.g. Fleisch and Mattern 2005; Bullinger and ten Hompel 
2007). Here are spoken of “cyber-physical systems” (CPS) 
which open huge and previously unknown potential for 
many different application areas such as housing, medical, 
or transportation systems, in addition to general industrial 
production (e.g. Geisberger and Broy 2012). By the term 
CPS is understood the information technology interaction 
between, on the one hand, physical systems with embed-
ded software, and, on the other hand, global data networks 
with distributed and interactive application systems. More 
concretely, CPS means “smart” and “intelligent” devices, 
vehicles and equipment, as well as the logistics, coordina-
tion and management processes that are linked to advanced 
Internet applications. The hypothesis has therefore also been 
formulated that digitization is now on the point of encroach-
ing on the core areas of economic activity and thus of creat-
ing a hitherto unknown connectedness between completely 
new application areas and their societal consequences. The 
materiality of the processes in question however makes this 
new digitization wave far more complex than the previous 
one (e.g. Zuboff 2010; Geisberger and Broy 2012).
A main thematic point of the current debate is the digiti-
zation of industrial production and logistics, respectively the 
industrial application of CPS technologies which has been 
propagated since 2011 especially in Germany by computer 
and engineering researchers, influential business associa-
tions, technology-intensive companies in the electrical and 
mechanical engineering industries, as well as policymakers 
under the catchy label “Industry 4.0” (research Union and 
acatech 2013). On the one hand this connects to long-dis-
cussed and partially realized production concepts based on 
a progressive integrated use of databases for planning, man-
aging and monitoring of production (e.g. Westkämper et al. 
2007). Prominent among these was already in the 1980s the 
concept “Computer Integrated Manufacturing” (CIM) (Har-
rington 1973; Scheer 1987; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 1990). 
tion potentials with no less than disruptive social and eco-
nomic consequences (Avant 2014). In this view, a new era 
is recognizable that in the international debate is variously 
called the “second machine age” (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
2014), the “third industrial revolution” (Rifkin 2011) or, in 
the German-speaking world, the “fourth industrial revolu-
tion”—respectively, “Industry 4.0” (research Union and 
acatech 2013). Without question, this debate has all the 
characteristics of “hype”: spectacular changes and prospects 
are predicted and, in professional circles, politics and far 
beyond, no other issue is so often attributed such an impor-
tant role in the visions of future social and economic devel-
opment. One is reminded of the second half of the 1990s as 
the New Economy’s “multimedia”, “World Wide Web” and 
“e-commerce” seemed to hail the advent of a new societal 
prosperity. Therefore some observers of the current devel-
opment wonder whether the current debate is perhaps just 
“new wine” being poured into “old bottles” (e.g. Jasperneite 
2012).
In summing up this debate however, beyond all the 
rhetorical exaggerations there are some quite convincing 
arguments for the reality of an advance in technological 
development that is now taking place, the structural conse-
quences of which are still hardly foreseeable. The assump-
tion is that the development of digital technologies has 
reached a stage that is opening up entirely new qualities 
of application that are not structurally comparable to those 
of previous decades. To ground this claim of a new quality 
of technological development with considerably widened 
application potentials and structure-changing consequences, 
the literature invokes almost unanimously what has been a 
virtual leap in the technological progress of recent years 
(for different perspectives see e.g. Geisberger and Broy 
2012; Avant 2014; Brynjolfsson and McAffee 2014, p. 4; 
Evangelista et al. 2014). This development, for the major-
ity of authors, has brought an extremely ambivalent social 
change: the one hand, very beneficial consequences particu-
larly for income and potential for consumption. On the other 
hand digitization also brings some very thorny challenges 
in terms of accompanying changes to economic structures 
and work.
In the following therefore, digitization refers to the pro-
cess of socioeconomic change triggered by the introduction 
of digital technology, the application systems based on it, 
and especially, their production networks (Hess 2015). Here 
two phases of digitization can be distinguished: In the first 
phase, this process has already been established since at 
least the end of the 1990s in those sectors of the economy 
where the production, consumption and communication is 
directly based on intangible transactions and the use of data 
and information. These are above all service sectors such 
as music production and distribution, publishing and press, 
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work and industrial sociology.1 And finally, the analysis 
is based on information and production technology stud-
ies that deal more or less directly with the question of the 
consequences of digitization for work. Because of the par-
ticularly intensive discussion in Germany over the perspec-
tives on Industry 4.0, these resources are most often original 
German-language studies. Overall, the studies are directed 
at both social and macro-structural changes in the labor 
landscape, as well as possible conversion processes at the 
micro-level of individual companies and workplaces. As 
far as possible in the further argumentation these different 
levels will be taken up analytically in complement to each 
other.
3  Developmental perspectives on industrial work
Summarizing current research results on IT-related change 
in industrial work, a partly very divergent picture emerges, 
ultimately in order to justify the very different development 
perspectives on work. On the one hand this deals with the 
nationally and internationally much-discussed theses on the 
question of the quantitative employment effects of digitiza-
tion, and on the other, the question of the qualitative, i.e. 
structural consequences for jobs and skills.
3.1   Controversial employment effects
3.1.1  Long-term compensation for initial job losses
Concerning possible job losses caused by digitization 
research refers basically to the well-known debate about 
technological unemployment. As John Maynard Keynes put 
it the increase of technical efficiency takes place faster than 
we can deal with the problem of labor absorption (Keynes 
1963). In regard to this question, there is the often-cited 
“conventional wisdom” of labor-market research going 
back to Ricardo, according to which short-term negative 
employment effects of technological change are always 
compensated for in the longer term by efficiency gains, new 
products, new markets and new employment opportunities 
(e.g. Agion and Howitt 1994). Thus Evangelista et al. (2014) 
see, on the basis of a detailed literature review in antici-
pation of the adoption of digital technologies, little clear 
impact on employment. In particular, they emphasize that it 
is particularly difficult to attribute causal effects on employ-
ment to this technology. The reason for this lies in their 
potentially widespread use in many areas. Although sub-
stantial empirical studies are lacking, in the literature pre-
1 To be mentioned here are for example: Spath et al. 2013; Hirsch-Kre-
insen 2014; Botthof and Hartmann 2015; Kersten et al. 2014; Hirsch-
Kreinsen et al. 2015.
On the other hand it is stressed that Industry 4.0, compared 
to the previous approaches, is aiming for a completely 
new level of process automation. Through highly flexible 
Internet linkage of data levels with real factory processes, 
fundamentally new potentials for the planning, control and 
the organization of production processes and entire value 
chains are being opened. In addition, it is emphasized that 
the advanced use of customer and market data now possible 
is a prerequisite to the development of entirely new busi-
ness models and the acquisition of new market segments 
(e.g. Broy 2010; Reinhart et al. 2013; Sendler 2013). Over-
all therefore, all the authors therefore assume that with the 
realization and diffusion of Industry 4.0 systems, as well 
as generally with the increasing digitization of social and 
economic processes, conversion processes will be triggered 
that in the longer term are sustainable but not yet foresee-
able in their consequences for socioeconomic structures and 
particularly, for labor (e.g. Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 2015).
2  Research question and methodological basis
The following argument takes up the question of possible 
changes to industrial work particularly, tying it in with the 
previous, very much IT-related issues. Concretely, two 
themes are taken up that are central to the current debate 
over the digitization of industrial work: Firstly, the question 
of possible quantitative effects on employment, and sec-
ondly, that of the structural transformation of the job activi-
ties themselves and the skills sets that will be needed to 
perform them. The analysis presumes a broad understand-
ing of industrial work for a sufficient grasp of the import of 
this transformation process. Basically the concept includes 
all the directly and indirectly value-creating activities that 
occur in industrial operations, from the operative and execu-
tive levels of the work organization, to the strategic levels 
of planning, regulation and monitoring, to the areas of lower 
and mid-level management of production processes, as well 
as to the activities of technical experts.
the following argumentation is highly explorative in 
character and based on a review and systematic résumé of 
the available literature in the area of social science-oriented 
industrial and labor research that concerns itself more or 
less explicitly with the introduction of new technologies, 
e.g. studies in the sub-disciplines industrial engineering, 
psychology of work, sociology of work and social science 
research on innovation. In particular however, the results 
will be used of those few social science studies that have 
dealt in recent years with issues of the diffusion of infor-
mation technologies and their impact on labor. Specifically, 
these are several studies in the psychology of work and a 
few, especially more recent, reports from the sociology of 
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to assess the probability of computerisation for 702 occu-
pations, and the impacts of computerisation on US labour 
market outcomes. The authors differentiate between high, 
medium and low risk occupations, depending on their prob-
ability of computerisation. Their argument is that not only 
simple, but in particular routinizable tasks including more 
complex activities can be automated by the new technolo-
gies. Therefore, they conclude that almost half of all current 
jobs from the most various economic sectors could be sub-
stituted in this way. Their central message is that approxi-
mately 47 % of all activities on the American labor market 
over the next one or two decades are potentially threatened 
by automation (Frey and Osborne 2013, pp. 38.). Frey and 
Osborne speak of two different waves of far-reaching effects 
of computer applications on employment in the next few 
decades: the first wave comprises a pattern of progressive 
automation, namely the substitution of primarily routiniz-
able and at least partially non-routinized activities by digi-
tized technologies in the most various sectors. They expect 
a second wave of automation to follow, which will spread to 
activities comprising creative and socially interactive tasks. 
Their expectation is that, in contrast, “…most management, 
business, and finance occupations, which are intensive in 
generalist tasks requiring social intelligence, will be largely 
confined to the low-risk category. The same is true of most 
occupations in education, healthcare, as well as arts and 
media jobs.” (Frey and Osborne 2013, p. 40)
On the basis of the same concept analysis Bowles (2014) 
calculates similarly high job substitution risks for the Euro-
pean labor market. He differentiates between different 
country groups in Europe. With regard to the German labor 
market he concludes that more than 51 % of all activities 
were at risk of being replaced in the long term by automated 
processes through digitization. The reason for this high per-
centage is the importance of industrial work that may be 
threatened in the near future by especially rapid digitiza-
tion spurts. A study by INGDI Bank on the prospects for the 
German labor market comes to yet farther-reaching assump-
tions (ING DiBa 2015). This study, oriented on the analysis 
concept of Frey and Osborne, “investigated approximately 
81 % of low-level” and marginally employed persons in 
Germany. On this basis the study arrives at the statement 
that about 18.3 million, or 59 % of these jobs are at risk in 
their current form from the progressive technologizing of 
the German economy. The study indicates these are most 
often transport and storage activities, general auxiliary per-
sonnel, office and service-sector work. The authors of this 
study emphasize however at the same time that this is not 
expected to lead to abrupt job losses; rather, they expect a 
process of slow substitution or exchange, as new technolo-
gies, in particular easily deployable robots, come to domi-
nate only gradually. The principle however is to assume a 
dominates an optimistic view of the long-term employment 
effects of digital technologies. This is because one must see 
both the directly negative and the indirectly positive effects 
on employment as a result of efficiency improvements and 
price reductions, and the opening up of new markets (Evan-
gelista et al. 2014, p. 806).
A similarly positive view of the impact on employment 
can be found in the context of Germany’s 4.0 debate. Here 
are predicted not only generally high productivity gains and 
economic growth rates (e.g. Bauer et al. 2015), but with 
that also consistently positive employment effects. Thus, on 
the results of the study by Spath et al. (2013, pp. 46) the 
vast majority of industrial enterprises assume that human 
labor will remain significant in industrial production in the 
next few years and not be reduced. The same is found in a 
study by the Boston Consulting Group: “In our analysis of 
Industry 4.0’s impact on German manufacturing, we found 
that the growth it stimulates will lead to a 6 % increase in 
employment during the next 10 years…. And demand for 
employees in the mechanical engineering sector may rise 
even more—by as much as 10 % during the same period” 
(BCG 2015, p. 8). Following this study, job growth in Ger-
man manufacturing between 2015 and 2025 will amount 
numerically to about 390,000 jobs.
3.1.2  Sweeping job losses
In contrast, other authors argue that this employment com-
pensation mechanism is no longer at work in the labor 
market in conditions of today’s diffusion of digital technolo-
gies, as it was in the past. Thus Brynjolfsson and McAfee 
(2014, p. 177 ff.) emphasize that the increasingly rapid 
development and diffusion of digital technologies implies 
an increasingly widening gap between the new demands of 
technology and the generally more slowly effective socio-
economic adaptation mechanisms and the implicated oppor-
tunities for employees and institutions. The authors speak of 
an “…inability of our skills, organizations, and institutions 
to keep pace with technical change” (ibid.: 178). In addition, 
however, also the volume of available jobs for job seekers 
is dwindling increasingly, since the demand for many tasks 
and qualifications is dropping. Many jobs are being replaced 
by digitization, creating increasing job losses in those areas. 
The authors see their assumptions confirmed by the rising 
labor productivity and falling employment figures from the 
first half of the last decade (ibid.: 165).
Frey and Osborne reinforce this view with an analysis 
of the US labor market, which shows that very significant 
potentials for job losses go hand in hand with digital tech-
nologies. With regard to recent advances in “machine learn-
ing” and “mobile robotics”, the authors have developed a 
methodology to categorise occupations according to their 
susceptibility to computerization. This methodology is used 
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this activity share is relatively stable and secure against the 
presumed far-reaching substitution effects. Beyond these 
concrete numerical data that relativize far-reaching effects, 
there are more fundamental arguments that put into ques-
tion extensive substitution (see also part 4.1). It is pointed 
out that technological potentials are often overestimated, 
that both professional as well as activity structures have a 
longer-term high dynamic that works against linear auto-
mation effects, and finally, that macroeconomic adjustment 
processes, as also emphasized by the representatives of the 
compensation thesis (see above), are overlooked.
3.2  Divergent development paths for jobs and 
qualifications
The question of the structural change in job activities and 
qualifications as a result of digitization can also be scarcely 
given a definitive answer. To sum up the existing research 
results, a wide spectrum of different development paths 
of work can be assumed, which is delimited by two poles. 
These poles can be labelled the upgrading of qualifications 
and the polarization of qualifications. Summing up previous 
findings of social science labor research, these development 
perspectives of labor could also observed in earlier phases 
of mechanization of work processes (e.g. Altmann et al. 
1992). However, it can be assumed that in the current phase 
of the digitization these trends get worse in a specific way.
3.2.1  Upgrading of qualifications
The one pole describes a development path by which the 
digitization of work generally brings an appreciation, or an 
“upgrading” of required worker qualifications. This devel-
opment perspective is represented relatively strongly in 
both the scientific as well as public debate. Following the 
study by Zuboff (1988, pp. 10) on the consequences of the 
use of information technologies, an upgrading of qualifica-
tions is seen to take place in two ways:
On the one hand this is considered the result of progres-
sive computer technology automation of simple jobs that are 
extensively substituted. The prerequisite for this is, that it be 
routinized and to a large extent highly rule-based work that 
therefore can be taken over relatively easily by computer 
algorithms. As aforementioned, Frey and Osborne (2013) 
speak in this context of waves of extensive substitution 
effects of computer use that are foreseeable for the coming 
years particularly in these activities. This upgrading model 
is referred to in the literature also as “skill-biased techni-
cal change”—i.e. the winners in the progressive substitution 
by digitized technologies are those groups of workers who 
already feature higher qualifications and more behavioral 
resources (see also Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014, p. 136).
fundamental transformation of the labor market as a result 
of digitization and Industry 4.0.
3.1.3  Relativizations
It is not surprising that the outlined forecasts of far-reach-
ing job losses through the application of digital technolo-
gies in the political and scientific debate are controversial 
to the extreme. Although some authors in the context of the 
“Industry 4.0” debate also assume that the employment vol-
ume in total could shrink, they reject the volumes of job 
losses mentioned. The critical arguments listed relate pri-
marily to the fact that in these labor market forecasts it was 
purely a potential assessment of technological development 
and static analyses of occupations; ultimately, these are 
“automation probabilities” for existing occupations, with-
out regard to the specific operating conditions involved. 
Above all however, some critics say studies such as those 
of Frey and Osborne (2014) neglect the peculiarities of the 
actual activities of the different occupational groups which, 
in an assessment of their activities substitutability, can lead 
to differentiated results. Thus, starting from these consider-
ations Bonin et al. come to significantly lower predictions: 
the share of jobs with a high level of automation probability 
in the US is at just 9 %, while in Germany this is still only 
12 % (Bonin et al. 2015, pp. 14). In a recently published 
studies by Dengler and Matthes present similar findings for 
the German labor market on the base of a further developed 
methodology. They calculate the substitution potentials of 
occupations based on German occupational data from an 
expert data base of the Federal Employment Agency. Fol-
lowing their results 15 % of employees have a high substitu-
tion potential in the year 2013 in Germany; these employees 
are employed in an occupation in which more than 70 % of 
the tasks could be substituted by computers (Dengler and 
Matthes 2015).2
In the opinion of other critics, the assessments of possible 
job losses above all completely neglect the highly qualitative 
job skills required for working with complex technologies. 
Their argument is that because these are indispensable to the 
efficiency of digitized processes, they present an obstacle to 
far-reaching automation attempts. This is pointed out par-
ticularly by Sabine Pfeiffer and Anne Suphan (2015), who 
show on the basis of their “work capacity index” that the 
greater part of the workforce is able to deal with technol-
ogy related complexity demands on the basis of available 
experiential resp. implicit knowledge, and that such workers 
are therefore crucial to coping with the challenge of digi-
tization. They name here a share of 71 % of all employed 
persons in Germany (ibid.: p. 222). The conclusion is that 
2 See also similar findings of a study based on scenario analysis about 
the economic consequences of “Industry 4.0” by Wolter et al. (2015).
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replaced by automated processes. The central feature of this 
organizational model is that there are no defined tasks for 
individual employees. Rather, the work “collective” func-
tions in a self-organized, highly flexible and situationally 
determined way, varying its behavior with the problems to 
be solved in and on the technological system. However a 
frame of action exists, predetermined by top-level manage-
ment, prescribing the basic rules of action, strategic objec-
tives, collective orientations and guiding policies, for an 
optimally trouble-free and smooth technological process 
(Neef and Burmeister 2005).
In other words, this model of work organization aims for 
the explicit use of informal social processes of communi-
cation and cooperation and the associated extra-functional 
skills and the accumulated specific process knowledge of 
employees. To follow Böhle (1992), this organization model 
is based on the necessary interplay of general social capa-
bilities such as communication and methodological skills 
with practical work-process knowledge specific to the given 
manufacturing process.
3.2.2  Polarization of qualifications
The other pole is represented by the notion of the “polar-
ization” of job activities and skills. Its central developmen-
tal mechanism is an increasing erosion and replacement of 
medium-level skills. Accompanying this is a growing share 
of demanding, high-qualification activities on the one hand, 
and the preservation and partly the expansion of easier but 
not routinized and therefore not automatable activities on 
the other. This thesis is particularly prominently represented 
by the author, as well as Dorn (2013), Collins (2014) and 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) who, especially in macro-
structural perspective point to the development of the US 
labor market, but also variously to transformations in the 
EU labor market (e.g. Goos et al. 2009; Bowles 2014). On 
this view, generally in the last two decades the proportions 
of demanding jobs in managerial, technical and professional 
occupations, but also those of less demanding activities in 
the service and industrial sector, have increased, while the 
shares of medium-skill job areas such as sales, administra-
tion and industrial production have stagnated or decreased.
The reason for this development is that not only simple, 
routinized activities, but especially also many activities on 
intermediate skill levels can be automated and thus substi-
tuted. The prerequisite however for this is that these should 
be activities of a well-structured and rule-oriented character 
and can therefore be suitably algorithmized. Specifically, 
these have been usually quite demanding types of produc-
tion work such as machine, e.g. automotive installation and 
system monitoring, as well as many routine administrative 
and service activities on medium skill levels (Autor 2010; 
Marin 2014; for an overview see Autor 2013). As already 
On the other hand, upgrading can be understood as a 
process that captures all employee groups in general. Digi-
tization of work in this perspective is a process of the com-
puterization of work which makes increasingly available a 
wide variety of information about ongoing processes. Their 
complexity and possible uses result fundamentally in new 
and hitherto unknown requirements for all activities. Zuboff 
therefore speaks of the growing importance of “intellec-
tive skills” based above all on a theoretical understand-
ing of processes, i.e. the ability to grasp the prerequisites 
and consequences of the use of data available at any time 
(Zuboff 1988, p. 94). The general consequence would be 
“better jobs—jobs that at every level would be enriched by 
an informating technology” (ibid.: 159). Zuboff describes 
this development perspective that information technology 
has the unique capacity to “informate” nearly all activities 
and jobs (ibid.: 10).
These tendencies towards qualification upgrading are 
reflected in the literature, especially for current information 
technology applications of the “Internet of things”, because 
such systems provide, through their data acquisition and 
evaluation, a degree of transparency over production pro-
cesses in a previously unknown way (Zammuto et al. 2007; 
Evangelista et al. 2014; Boos et al. 2013). Thus also in the 
public and innovation policy debate over Industry 4.0, it 
is also emphasized that in future, a general upgrading of 
qualifications will be possible and also certainly will occur. 
Here reference may be made to Henning Kagermann as rep-
resentative of a great variety of authors and positions, and 
one of the leading advocates of Industry 4.0 in Germany, in 
whose opinion people in the future will be employed less as 
“machine operators” than as “more in the role of mediators 
of experience, as decision-makers and coordinators…[that 
is,] the variety of job content for the individual employee 
will increase” (Kagermann 2014, p. 608; e.g. also Bauern-
hansel 2014; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 2014).
This perspective on the development of work corresponds 
to a model of work organization at the enterprise level char-
acterized by a high degree of structural openness, a very 
limited division of labor and high flexibility. For, as labor 
sociological findings show, this is the organizational pre-
condition for the qualifications and experience of employ-
ees to be brought to bear in the ongoing system and, above 
all, for them to be able to cope at any time with unantici-
pated incidents and particular situations through competent 
and experience-tested action. In the debate over the digitiza-
tion of work, one model of work organization is variously 
emphasized for its perspective on the evolution of change in 
work: holistic organization or, metaphorically, also swarm 
organization (Hirsch-Kreinsen 2014). This organizational 
model is characterized by a loose network of qualified and 
equally entitled employees. Simple and low-skill jobs are 
not to be found because they have been (or will be) largely 
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as a contradictory combination of the design principles of 
decentralization and task-area broadening on the one hand, 
and of structuring and standardization on the other hand 
(e.g. Kinkel et al. 2008). In this way companies avoid high-
risk or uncertain organizational innovations by following 
this already established path of work organization design. 
This model can thus be called in abbreviated form polarized 
organization.
3.2.3  Developmental alternatives
To summarize, it can be said that some very divergent devel-
opment perspectives for digitized work can be argued. Quite 
obviously it is not possible to speak of the “one best way” 
of task and organizational design. It should also be stressed 
that the outlined poles of the spectrum of possible trends 
and work organization models denote conceivably extreme 
cases in the future situation. Rather, it is to be assumed that, 
in dependence on specific application conditions, system 
functions and structural workplace conditions, diverging 
and intermediate patterns of work organization will attune 
themselves to one another and ultimately become the object 
of company decision-making processes.
However, in labor research, plausible reasons for the pos-
sible relevance of swarm organization can be given in the 
context of the adoption of digitized production systems: An 
effective system control by skilled workers can be assured 
with minimally regulated, informal and cooperative forms 
of work processes (Lee and Seppelt 2009; Cummings and 
Bruni 2009). Moreover, it is quite possible in the context of 
such a model of work organization to maintain control over 
real-time decision-making and communication processes 
(Spath et al. 2013, p. 115). In addition it is emphasized that 
complex systems change states “spontaneously” and have 
intransparent and unpredictable effects (Grote 2005) that 
require highly flexible workplace interventions that are as 
unplannable as they are uncontrollable. In addition, it is 
assumed that the lengthy introduction and start-up phases 
of Industry 4.0 systems are due to their complexity, in the 
course of which activities and work organization must show 
a high degree of flexibility and problem-solving skills, while 
still far from able to reach a definable (end-) state. Finally, 
the “lifecycle” of complex systems is referred to, which can 
always involve new system states that are difficult to con-
trol; both unexpected start-up problems, as well as current 
problems and unexpected disturbances in normal operation 
can subsequently only be overcome in the context of open 
and informally designed forms of work (BMWi 2013).
Finally, in this context, it should be asked what effects 
the information-technologically possible temporal and 
spatial separation of work functions from the real process, 
and above all the possibilities of their temporal and spatial 
flexibilization will have for the design of work and the dis-
described in the context of the consequences of the new tech-
nologies for the labor-market (see Part 3.1), through the new 
technologies also relatively routinized work in segments of 
mid-range complexity and income is also becoming increas-
ingly automated. Complex activities in high-wage areas 
such as management, consulting or financial services, and 
low-wage jobs such as simple manipulation and monitoring 
activities, nurses and geriatric nurses, however, enjoy high 
demand (Marin 2014). Goos and Manning characterize this 
trend as the emergence of “Lousy and Lovely Jobs” (Goos 
and Manning 2007).
This macrostructural justification for a polarizing trend 
is mirrored by research that focusses on the workplace 
level, such as a broad German study on the development of 
skilled-worker jobs in industrial companies, whose authors 
fear a progressive “de-skilling and part-substitution” of 
intermediate skill levels as a result of information technol-
ogy automation in those areas. They can speak at best only 
of the uncertain destiny of such “residual categories” of 
skilled labor which are activities that cannot be automated 
or would cause a disproportionate expense in order to be 
automated (TA 2007; Kinkel et al. 2008; Düll 2013). Simi-
larly argue Windelband et al. (2011) in their study of work 
in the context of intelligence-networked logistics systems, 
which creates at the enterprise level the tendency towards a 
differentiated structure of activities between sophisticated, 
high-skill jobs on the one hand, and some remaining but 
devalued specialist tasks and non-automated simple activi-
ties on the other hand. This deskilling is also referred to as 
“Digital Taylorism” since the digital technologies allow an 
optimization of Taylor’s principles of work simplification 
and work control especially for complex tasks (The Econo-
mist 2015, p. 63). However, also new jobs for low-skilled 
workers may arise thereby. It can therefore be assumed that 
low-skilled employees will be not, as the Upgrading thesis 
assumed, largely substituted by digital technologies.3
This perspective of polarization corresponds at the enter-
prise level to a work-organizational design model with a 
strongly exhibited division of labor. On the one hand it is 
characterized by a low number of simple activities with 
little or no room for maneuver, such as standardized moni-
toring and control tasks. On the other hand, an extended 
or even newly created group of highly qualified experts 
and technical specialists emerge whose skill level is well 
above the previous skilled-worker level. These workers are 
responsible not only for dispositive issues such as coping 
with disturbances, but they also take on various tasks of 
production management. This model of work organization 
corresponds largely to currently prevailing forms of work 
in many high-tech companies, which can be characterized 
3 Concerning the contradictory consequences of digitization for low-
skilled work see Hirsch-Kreinsen (2016).
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the critical debate over “technological determinism” of the 
1970s and 80 s, it has been thought that a relation exists 
between the implementation of certain technical systems 
and the consequences for work, which is influenced by 
many non-technical and social factors. By no means should 
it be assumed—just on the basis of the technology—that 
there is a clear and constant relationship between the two 
dimensions (Lutz 1987; for a summary: Pfeiffer 2013).
Overall therefore it can be maintained that an under-
standing of the relationship between the proliferation of 
digital technologies and their social consequences is never 
linear and deterministic. Rather, it is a matter of a com-
plex and reciprocal relationship shaped by the influence of 
multiple economic, social and labor-political factors that 
ultimately determines in what way the given new techno-
logical application potentials will actually be put to work, 
and what outcomes for labor will emerge (Evangelista et 
al. 2014, p. 803). Moreover, as technology research in the 
sociology of work of recent decades has shown, it is often 
the form of the labor-organization’s embeddedness in and 
the ultimate form of the new technologies that are the deter-
mining factors for their use. It has become clear particularly 
that technical and organizational design alternatives always 
exist that remain the domain of company and labor policy 
decision-making processes (Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 1990; 
Brödner 1997).
The analysis and ultimately the organization of the pro-
cess of digitization of work, i.e. the interaction of the new 
technology with the resulting personnel and organizational 
changes therefore requires a conceptual view of the overall 
context of the production, and the interdependencies that 
are at work within it. An analytical starting point for this is 
offered by the concept of the “sociotechnical system” which 
encompasses the interdependent relationship between the 
technological, organizational and human elements of an 
overall system of production (Trist and Bamforth 1951). 
Although this has not always been defined consistently in 
research, approximatively, and after Rice (1963), a socio-
technical system can be understood as a production unit con-
sisting of interdependent technological, organizational and 
personnel subsystems. This means that, while the techno-
logical subsystem limits the design possibilities of the other 
two subsystems, these have independent labor-psychologi-
cal, labor-policy and organizational features which in turn 
react with the functioning of the technological subsystem. 
This concept avoids asking only about the functioning of the 
processes of change in individual technical and non-techni-
cal elements, but instead it puts the overall interaction and 
combination of elements—hence the technosocial—into the 
focus of the analysis.
If one now asks what concrete determining factors are 
relevant to the system design and forms of work we find in 
the current literature thus far only few indications. How-
tribution of capabilities (Kinkel et al. 2008, p. 245). This 
option applies to the activities at the shop-floor level as well 
as those at higher hierarchical levels, because the bound-
aries of organizational structures are confused in this way; 
it is probably becoming more and more difficult to speak 
of well-defined models of work organization and company 
hierarchy, while work processes are taking on an increas-
ingly informal and unstructured character. Communication 
and social interaction in the work process will perhaps then 
be mediated mainly or only through IT and other media-
applications, and the above model of swarm organization 
will possibly predominate as the leading form of largely 
unbounded work. Thus new forms of cross-company dis-
tributed, Internet-based, and in tendency global labor 
relationships are conceivable, which have recently been dis-
cussed under the heading of “crowdwork” (e.g. Leimeister 
and Zogaj 2013; Benner 2014).
4  Determining factors
4.1  Conceptual considerations
Because apparently in the case of smart production systems 
there are very different developmental paths of production 
work, the question is understandable what determinants 
influence the development of organization, jobs and quali-
fications. The answer to this question, however, requires 
preliminary conceptual clarifications, because a large num-
ber of relevant studies and analyzes suggests a conception 
which assumes a more or less deterministic relationship 
between technological development and the consequences 
for work. According to this, there is currently taking place 
a “technology push” with ultimately clear and predictable 
social and economic trends toward change (e.g. Evangelista 
et al. 2014). By contrast, both innovation research as well 
as work-sociological technology studies have at their dis-
position a broad stock of conceptual and empirical research 
results that show instructively how the development, dif-
fusion and implementation of new technologies proceeds 
anything but seamlessly and consistently, and that above 
all the social effects are scarcely derivable unambiguously. 
Thus evolutionary theory approaches to innovation research 
have long emphasized that innovations, though always 
purposeful and dynamic, are at the same time chronically 
risky in their course and uncertain in outcome. Decisive for 
each historical pattern of innovation and thereby the initi-
ated structural changes that play out, are thereby, for one, 
the development and variation of technologically possible 
potential, and for another, its environmental selection in the 
light of application requirements and marketing opportuni-
ties for new technologies and their products (e.g. Fagerberg 
2005). Similarly argues the sociology of work: Ever since 
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acting on complex installations, make possible informal and 
manipulative action and ongoing learning processes, and 
thereby permit a sufficient regulative capacity of the total 
system.
To follow Grote’s formulation, with such an approach the 
specific strengths and weaknesses of humans and technol-
ogy will not be regarded “…in the sense of an either-or, 
human or technology, …but rather merged into a new qual-
ity of the total system by means of a thorough elaboration 
of the human-technology interaction.” For this the three 
dimensions of the sociotechnical system concept are equally 
involved in the system development in order to make it able 
to deal with variations and disruptions (Grote 2005, p. 67). 
As essential formative criteria are mentioned for example 
(ibid.): the possibilities to monitor the technology, a moti-
vation-oriented task structure, as well as an organizationally 
enabled self-regulation of activities.
4.3  Implementation process
In total, these considerations and findings indicate the great 
influence not only of the fundamental development and for-
mative processes of the new production systems, but also of 
the actual implementation process of a new system at each 
end-user plant on the development of industriel work. The 
significance of the implementation process for the ultimate 
system design and model of production work realized is 
grounded above all in the fact that the new smart systems 
normally cannot be implemented at all as “turnkey solu-
tions” or as it were, “plug-and-play-ready” in workplaces. 
And it is only seldom the case that an intelligent factory 
is built from the ground up on the “greenfield” as a total 
concept. Rather, most autonomous systems will probably be 
integrated first as “island solutions” within bigger produc-
tion segments in existing technical-organizational structures 
of user companies. Therefore in the concrete introduction 
phase, under certain circumstances a long and drawn-out, 
costly and reciprocal process of coordination between the 
new system and the existing plant’s conditions will be 
required.
Here attention is drawn particularly to the extremely 
costly harmonization of the new system with existing data-
bases and systems (Spath et al. 2013, p. 123; also: Schuh and 
Stich 2013, p. 229). Overall therefore exhaustive introduc-
tory and startup phases in smart systems should be assumed, 
in the course of which production activities and the work 
organization will have to demonstrate high flexibility and 
problem-solution capabilities, and can hardly be expected 
to soon reach a definable end-state. Variously are mentioned 
also the “life-cycle” of such complex installations continu-
ously new and difficult system conditions that permanently 
require ever-newer forms of work organization and person-
nel engagement (BMWI 2013).
ever, if one looks at the older literature on the introduction 
of computer-integrated manufacturing systems (Schultz-
Wild et al. 1986; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 1990), two deter-
mining factors can be regarded as crucial for the design of 
the whole system und especially for the development of 
work: the technologically oriented automation concept fol-
lowed by each of the user companies, and associated with 
that, the introduction processes of the new systems. Both 
factors will be discussed briefly in the following.
4.2  Alternative automation concepts
As to the determining factors in the development of work, a 
first answer is provided by a glance at the interdependence 
relations between the technical and non-technical elements 
of a sociotechnical system, in particular the design of the 
technical subsystem and the associated room for organiza-
tion and work. Following the literature, one can speak of 
“alternative automation concepts”. Here two fundamentally 
different system designs can be distinguished (e.g. Holl-
nager and Bye 2000; Kaber and Endsley 2004; Cummings 
and Bruni 2009; Lee and Seppelt 2009; Grote 2005):
One is a technology-centered automation concept. This 
conception takes the direction of a far-going replacement 
of work functions by automatic installations. The role of 
human intervention in the work has then only a compensa-
tory character. The remaining tasks for workers are those 
that can be automated only with difficulty or not at all, and 
are generally surveillance tasks. Otherwise formulated, 
human action in the work has now a temporary function and 
the conceivable final state of such a system conception is 
its complete automation. Unquestionably, with this system 
concept there are progressively narrower limits on the place 
for human creativity in the work.
On the other hand, a complementary automation concept 
posits the development of a distribution of tasks between 
humans and machines which should make possible a sat-
isfactory functional capability of the total system. This 
design requires a holistic or collaborative perspective on 
the human-machine interaction which identifies the specific 
strengths and weaknesses of both human labor and technical 
automation. For the development of work in this concep-
tion, a technological framework is established that can serve 
in different ways.
In the relevant social-science literature it is unanimously 
assumed that only a complementary system interpretation 
is sufficient for the optimal exploitation of the technologi-
cal and economic potential of smart production systems, 
for it doesn’t relegate human intervention in work systems 
to only a few fragmentary functional remains, as does the 
technology-centered automation concept. Instead, the com-
plementary conception opens design possibilities for work 
that minimizes e.g. awareness and feedback problems of 
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and lean production, by which often sustainable effi-
ciency gains and increases in the steerability potential 
of processes are realized. In this regard the concept con-
tradicts in several ways the dominant guiding wisdom 
on how to structure an efficient factory. Besides, there 
is often reserve out of (very comprehensible) fears for 
the data security of the complex databases that must be 
elaborated in highly networked, intelligent production 
systems.
 ● Third, organizational inertia should be taken into account. 
This is probably the particular consequence of the neces-
sary restructuring of company planning and control lev-
els, and a changed distribution of duties between IT and 
production technology. For generally, IT competencies 
and duties should increase massively in importance and 
be merged with the other existing production-technical 
competencies. There is concern that, in particular, tech-
nical experts could use their existing influential position 
to slow down rapid change or even block it. Possibly 
such a defensive stance towards a loss of competence 
(or autonomy) could also be hardened by the fear of the 
surveillance potential of the digital systems.
It can be assumed therefore that in the industrial sector in 
total, in the medium term a rather differentiated landscape 
of the diffusion and application of smart production systems 
will be observed. Above all such enterprises will seize the 
opportunity of the new systems who, because of high flexi-
bility requirements, are permanently under pressure to inno-
vate and rationalize, and in the new systems see a chance 
to achieve sustainable productivity increases. Typical of 
these are technology-intensive, strong mid-scale firms who 
above all have the necessary qualified personnel and capa-
bilities and have made famous the German industrial struc-
ture. Examples are medium-sized, technology intensive and 
highly innovative firms of the mechanical engineering and 
metal industries. Also the area of logistics, because of its 
standardized processes and rapid growth, should become in 
the mid-term a promising user of smart systems (cf. Spath et 
al. 2013; Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 2015).
By contrast, rather reserved towards smart systems will 
be such enterprises who, as large-scale producers, have 
already progressed very far in highly automated produc-
tion technologies and organization. For them, specific and 
newer automation logics of smart systems would prob-
ably endanger their achievement of high productivity and 
with that, their existing competitive advantage. Examples 
are flexible, large-scale producers in the automotive and 
electro-technical sectors. Presumably these systems will 
also scarcely interest the wide area of technologically low-
intensity small and middle-size enterprises (SMEs) (cf. FAZ 
2014). The reasons for this lie, for one thing, in the limited 
resources and capabilities of most SMEs, who therefore 
Whether and how these challenges are managed depends 
in turn on many additional company and management-
structural factors. Earlier studies on the introduction of com-
puter-integrated systems thus point to the often overloaded 
factory resources of planning capacity, know-how and avail-
able financial leeway. The restrictive influence of a lack of 
resources is particularly evident when smaller and scarcely 
technology-intensive firms decide to adopt smart produc-
tion systems. Furthermore the course of the implementation 
process may be affected by labor- and company-political 
issues. As relevant may also be considered the internal con-
stellation of plant actors participating in the introduction, as 
for example in the way key promoters in management, or 
in project-group formation, commit themselves to decision-
making processes. Which automation concept ensues in 
specific cases, and how the work organization comes to be 
structured, could be decisively influenced by which actors 
are especially influential.
Conclusions
To sum up, currently smart production systems may have 
only limited development prospects and it should be empha-
sized that the possibilities of realization have by far not 
been definitively recognized. This is because the industrial 
diffusion of these systems, with their structure-changing 
character, is confronted by technical, economic and social 
barriers that are hard to overcome. In other words, it must 
be assumed that the innovation of smart production systems 
has an exceptionally paradoxical character.4 Its structure-
changing effects provoke simultaneously opposition, limita-
tions and barriers to its realization. This can be due to the 
following factors:
 ● First, there are the above-mentioned problems of data 
migration and the integration of the new systems into 
the existing production structures and databases, the 
costs and complexities of which presently seem scarcely 
fathomable.
 ● Second, indications of acceptance problems of the new 
concept on the part of management and among indus-
try practitioners cannot be overlooked. A substantial role 
plays here quite evidently a widespread skeptical attitude 
towards the automation and the efficiency promised by 
the smart systems, based on their long years of practical 
and contradictory experiences with automation. Beyond 
that, smart systems with their technological principles of 
decentralized, automated self-organization collides with 
widespread organizational concepts of standardization 
4 In innovation research an “innovation paradox” is referred to when 
a technological innovation carries within itself reasons for its failure 
(e.g. Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009).
1 3
11Digitization of industrial work: development paths and prospects
1. Die Konsequenzen für Industriearbeit werden sowohl 
in quantitativer als auch qualitativer Hinsicht kon-
trovers diskutiert und die formulierten Thesen sind 
teilweise widersprüchlich. In Hinblick auf mögliche 
Arbeitsplatzverluste ist unstrittig, dass die Digitalisier-
ung von Industriearbeit kurzfristig zu Freisetzungen 
führen wird. Umstritten ist derzeit aber, ob diese sich 
dauerhaft durchsetzen oder ob Freisetzungseffekte län-
gerfristig durch neu entstehende Aufgaben und Arbe-
itsplätze kompensiert werden. Insgesamt allerdings ist 
zu befürchten, dass besonders einfache Tätigkeiten mit 
niedrigen Qualifikationsanforderungen in Zukunft zune-
hmend durch digitale Technologien substituiert werden.
Auch in Hinblick auf die Entwicklung von Tätigkeiten und 
Qualifikationen sind unterschiedliche Trends erkennbar:
 ● Auf der einen Seite finden sich Tendenzen des Upgrad-
ing von Tätigkeiten und Qualifikationen. Upgrading von 
Qualifikationen kann dabei als Folge der Automatisier-
ung einfacher und gering qualifizierter Tätigkeiten und 
dem Erhalt und dem Ausbau qualifizierter Tätigkeiten. 
Darüber hinaus kann Upgrading aber auch als ein Proz-
ess verstanden werden, der generell alle Beschäftigten-
gruppen erfasst.
 ● Auf der anderen Seite finden sich Tendenzen, die als 
Polarisierung von Tätigkeiten und Qualifikationen 
gefasst werden können. Der Kern der Polarisierungsthese 
ist, dass sich zunehmend eine Schere zwischen kom-
plexen Tätigkeiten mit hohen Qualifikationsanforderun-
gen einerseits und einfachen Tätigkeiten mit niedrigem 
Qualifikationsniveau andererseits öffnet und mittlere 
Qualifikationsgruppen dramatisch an Bedeutung ver-
lieren. Daher werden einfache Tätigkeiten auch kaum 
durch Automatisierung verschwinden, vielmehr werden 
neue einfache Tätigkeiten mit niedrigen Qualifikation-
sanforderungen entstehen.
2. Ganz offensichtlich kann nicht von einem “one-best-
way” der Aufgaben- und Organisationsgestaltung 
gesprochen werden kann. Es ist vielmehr davon aus-
zugehen, dass sich je nach konkreten Anwendungs-
bedingungen, Systemfunktionen und betrieblichen 
Strukturbedingungen divergierende Muster der Arbeit 
einspielen. Grundsätzlich ist keineswegs von einem ein-
deutigen Zusammenhang zwischen Technikeinsatz und 
dem Wandel von Arbeit auszugehen. Vielmehr verfügt 
sozialwissenschaftliche Arbeitsforschung über einen 
breiten Fundus konzeptioneller und empirischer Forsc-
hungsergebnisse, die instruktiv zeigen, dass die Ent-
wicklung, die Implementation neuer Technologien alles 
andere als bruchlos und widerspruchsfrei verlaufen und 
vor allem die sozialen Effekte kaum eindeutig ableitbar 
aren’t usually willing to go for technological experiments 
with uncertain results. For another thing, many SMEs are in 
sectors that are traditionally successful producing relatively 
standardized goods at a modest level of automated technol-
ogy. These enterprises, for example in nutrition products, 
the furniture industry or metal goods, are subjected to only 
low-flexibility demands, so that costly and risky automa-
tion measures for them will probably not even need to be 
seriously considered. These forms of low-qualification, 
straightforward industry jobs should therefore remain in the 
foreseeable future.
Overall however, hardly any definitive and sure assump-
tions about the future dispersion of smart production sys-
tems can be formulated. The arguments made here are 
therefore highly hypothetical. But with that a wide field of 
future social-science research on innovation and work is 
laid out which will concern itself with changes in the work 
of production in the context of the introduction of smart 
production systems. Such an agenda could take in analyti-
cally oriented basic research as well as projects in applied 
research, for example on technologically oriented develop-
ment and application attempts. In any case however, the 
newness and complexity of this area only make still more 
obvious the need for an interdisciplinary approach between 
the technical and social sciences. Above all the burning 
question—and one in no way yet even approaching a defini-
tive answer—is whether this economic and social develop-
ment, as the German discussion surrounding Industry 4.0 
would have it, is indeed the threshold of a “4th Industrial 
Revolution”.
5  Kurzfassung
Im Beitrag werden erste Forschungsergebnisse über die 
Konsequenzen des Einsatzes digitaler Technologien für 
industrielle Arbeit zusammengefasst. Der Fokus richtet 
sich besonders auf die Entwicklung der deutschen Indust-
rie, deren Entwicklung unter dem Label „Industrie 4.0“ seit 
längerem intensiv diskutiert wird. Ausgangsannahme ist, 
dass gegenwärtig ein weit reichender Technologieschub in 
der industriellen Produktion stattfindet. Es wird dabei davon 
ausgegangen, dass sich mit Industrie 4.0 weitereichend neue 
Produktivitäts- und Marktpotentiale für die industrielle 
Produktion verbinden. Insbesondere wir von grundlegenden 
Strukturveränderungen der Arbeitsprozesse ausgegangen. 
Wie sich Industriearbeit allerdings verändert, ist offen und 
Gegenstand intensiver Diskussionen. Auf der Basis der der-
zeit vorliegenden Literatur und der Forschungsergebnisse 
können auf diese Frage derzeit keine endgültigen Antworten 
gegeben werden. Der derzeitige Stand der Forschung lässt 
sich in den folgenden Punkten zusammenfasen:
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diesen Gründen ist mit einem schnellen Wandel von 
Industriearbeit zunächst nicht zu rechnen. Vielmehr 
dürften sich längerfristig industriestrukturell bestehende 
Segmentationslinien zwischen unterschiedliche Qualifi-
kationsniveaus, die mit unterschiedlichen Branchen und 
Betriebstypen korrelieren, vertiefen.
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sind. Die Analyse des Zusammenspiels der neuen Tech-
nologie und der dadurch induzierten personellen und 
organisatorischen Veränderungen erfordert vielmehr 
den Blick auf das sozio-technische Gesamtsystem der 
Produktion und die hier wirksamen Zusammenhänge.
3. Einen besonderen Einfluss auf die Entwicklung und 
Gestaltung von Arbeit hat die konkrete Auslegung der 
digitalen Systeme. Einerseits kann von einem technol-
ogiezentrierten Automatisierungskonzept gesprochen 
werden. Diese Konzeption läuft auf eine weitreichende 
Substituierung von Arbeitsfunktionen durch die autom-
atische Anlage hinaus. Anders formuliert, menschliches 
Arbeitshandeln hat in diesem Fall eine Lückenbüßer-
funktion und der denkbare Endzustand einer solchen 
Systemauslegung ist die vollständige Automation. 
Andererseits kann von einem komplementären Automa-
tisierungskonzept gesprochen werden. Dieses Gestal-
tungskonzept richtet sich darauf, eine Aufgabenteilung 
zwischen Mensch und Maschine zu entwerfen, die eine 
zufriedenstellende Funktionsfähigkeit des Gesamtsys-
tems ermöglicht. Für die Gestaltung von Arbeit wird bei 
dieser Systemkonzeption ein technologischer Rahmen 
gesetzt, der in unterschiedlicher Weise genutzt werden 
kann.
Weiterhin verweisen die vorliegenden Befunde auf die 
Bedeutung des je konkreten Einführungsprozesses der 
neuen Systeme bei Anwenderbetrieben. Denn erst in des-
sen Verlauf ergibt sich in der Regel die konkrete Gestaltung 
des gesamten sozio-technischen Systems. Die Bedeutung 
des betrieblichen Einführungsprozesses für die letztendli-
che Systemauslegung und die sich durchsetzenden Muster 
von Produktionsarbeit begründet sich dabei vor allem in 
dem Umstand, dass die neuen Systeme im Rahmen lang-
wieriger und aufwendiger Abstimmungsprozesse mit den 
bestehenden betrieblichen Bedingungen eingeführt werden 
müssen. In deren Verlauf müssen Tätigkeiten und Qualifi-
kationen eine hohe Flexibilität aufweisen und können dabei 
auch mittelfristig kaum einen definierbaren (End-)Zustand 
erreichen.
4. Fragt man nach den Anwendungsperspektiven des 
Konzepts Industrie 4.0 und den damit verbundenen Kon-
sequenzen für Industriearbeit, so muss betont werden, 
dass seine Realisationsmöglichkeiten bei Weitem nicht 
ausgelotet sind. Denn die industrielle Diffusion von 
Industrie 4.0-Systemen ist auf Grund ihres disruptiven 
und strukturverändernden Charakters mit nur schwer 
überwindbaren technischen, ökonomischen und sozi-
alen Einführungsbarrieren konfrontiert. Angenommen 
werden kann daher¸ dass sich im industrieller Sektor 
Deutschlands mittelfristig eine differenzierte Landschaft 
von Industrie 4.0-Anwendungen durchsetzen wird. Aus 
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